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THE LABOR BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE DOCTRINE
OF EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES-A
MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE
Plaintiffs were longshoremen seeking nomination for a forthcoming union
election. Defendants were officers of a local branch of the International Long-
shoremen's Association. Prior to the union meeting which would nominate candi-
dates to run for union offices presently held by the defendants, the local's execu-
tive board had recommended special eligibility requirements for prospective
nominees. This recommendation amounted to a bylaw amendment for which the
union's bylaws required notice at three consecutive meetings prior to a vote by
mail. Nevertheless, the recommendation was adopted immediately by a vote of
the members present at the nomination meeting.
The plaintiffs qualified for union office under the original bylaws but not
under the amended bylaws. Nonetheless, plaintiffs Gatto and Libutti were
nominated for the offices of local president and executive board member re-
spectively. Gatto's nomination made him incumbent Di Brizzi's only opponent in
the election for union president. After his nomination, and as he left the speak-
er's podium, Gatto was assaulted by one of defendant Di Brizzi's political allies.
The local's bylaws specified that a board of elections must be established
by vote of the general membership. Defendant Di Brizzi appointed a committee
of his own choosing to pass on the nominations. This board ruled that plaintiffs
were ineligible for office under the requirements recommended by the executive
board and adopted by those present at the nomination meeting. The net re-
sult was -that Di Brizzi was unopposed in his bid for re-election as president and
that there were seven candidates for the six positions on the executive board.
The plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief under 29 U.S.c. § 411(a) (1), that
section of the labor bill of rights' that guarantees union members "equal rights and
privileges... to nominate candidates .... The district court directed defendants
to afford each of the local's members a fair opportunity to nominate the candi-
date of their choice in accordance with the local's bylaws The defendants were
enjoined from conducting any election until -this nominating process was com-
pleted.3 The circuit court of appeals affirmed.4
' The "bill of rights" Section of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 101, 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1959) guarantees rank-
and-file union members equal rights in the union organization, freedom of speech and
assembly, freedom from capricious assessment of dues, protection of the right to sue, and
safeguards against improper disciplinary action. The next section (29 U.S.C. § 412)
provides that any person whose rights are secured by the bill of rights "may bring a
civil action in a U.S. District Court for such relief (including injunctions) as may be
appropriate."
2 Libutti v. Di Brizzi, 233 F. Supp. 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
3 The positive relief granted here was probably made impossible in any future case
on the same subject by a decision of the Supreme Court handed down about a month
after Libutti was decided. In Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964), the Court ruled
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Prior to bringing suit, the plaintiffs made no attempt to utilize intraunion ap-
pellate procedures. Consequently the defendants argued that relief should have
been denied on the ground that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their union remedies.
The district court sustained plaintiff's argument that any intraunion appeal would
be a futility in this case; the circuit court held that no recourse to the union tri-
bunals would be required because the initial union proceedings were void.
Libutti v. Di Brizzi5 is the latest offspring of a marriage of convenience per-
formed by the Second Circuit when it united an oft-criticized common law doc-
trine with an ambiguous statute. The marriage occurred in 1960 with the court's
decision in Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists.6 The oft-criticized com-
mon law doctrine is the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. The highly ambiguous
statute is the exhaustion proviso of 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4), a part of the labor bill
of rights. This note will examine the net effects of this merger upon the labor
community.
The Common Law Doctrine
It has generally 7 been true from the earliest court intervention in the affairs
of non-profit organizations that a suit is doomed to failure if the plaintiff-member
cannot prove either that he has exhausted all available appeals within the asso-
ciation or that his situation is one that falls within some exception to the exhaus-
tion of remedies rule.8
The exhaustion doctrine as applied to unions is based on three underlying
policies. First, it is desirable to reduce the burdens placed on the courts by allow-
ing unions to correct their own internal difficulties. Second, it is desirable to give
the courts the benefit of the supposedly expert judgment of union tribunals. Third,
it is desirable that courts allow the union full latitude in correcting its own mis-
takes.9
The chief difficulty in applying the exhaustion doctrine stems from the many
exceptions created by the courts.10 The first major exception to -the rule is the
concept of futility of appeal. If the proceedings to which the aggrieved member
must have recourse promise to be fruitless or manifestly unfair, the member need
not resort to .them."1 This exception is invoked ff the member can show a lack of
impartiality on the part of the union tribunal. A second concept is delay of ap-
that disputes relating to election of candidates for union office are not to be decided
in a suit brought by union members under the labor bill of rights.
4 Libutti v. Di Brizzi, 337 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1964).
5 Ibid.
6286 F.2d 75 (2dCir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
7 There is some authority at common law thkt exhaustion of remedies is not neces-
sary to the bringing of an action for damages. See Underwood v. Maloney, 152 F. Supp.
648, 658 (ED. Pa. 1957).
8 Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 154 & n.2, 161 A.2d 882, 886 & n.2
(1960).
9 Summers, The Law of Union Discipline, What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YAsE
L.J. 175, 207 (1960).
10 Ibid. See generally Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private Voluntary
Associations, 65 YALE L.J. 369 (1956); Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 1099 (1963).
11 Madden v. Atldns, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957).
peals. Usually, a delay of over a year is held to be too long;'2 this exception is
often used when the disciplined member is barred from his job. A third exception
is the doctrine of void proceedings.' 3 This is a catch-all exception. If the union
disciplines a member after a procedurally imperfect hearing or if the local's or
member's violation of the bylaws is not punishable, the entire union proceeding
may be deemed without jurisdiction and void.' 4 These broadly phrased excep-
tions, especially the third, have allowed courts to use the doctrine of exhaustion
as a make-weight. A case seldom arises in which a court cannot find grounds for
invoking one of these exceptions if plaintiff has valid grounds for a lawsuit.'
5
Studies made in 195116 and 195917 by an eminent labor law authority revealed
that an exception was found in -the majority of the cases where the defense of
exhaustion was raised. The compiler of these studies found few cases where relief
was refused solely for lack of exhaustion.' 8 Possibly because most courts have not
really trusted union tribunals,19 the judicial application of the exhaustion at com-
mon law has amounted to a repudiation of the doctrine through the liberal invo-
cation of its exceptions.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the common law doctrine of exhaustion has
long been criticized 20 and is generally thought to be in need of overhaul.
The Statutory Provision
In 1959, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act2 ' was enacted
into law. This act contains a "bill of rights" for labor which makes reference to
the exhaustion of intraunion remedies. This reference is contained in the para-
graph that guarantees union members the right to sue the union 22 and is phrased
in terms of a qualification placed upon that right. The statute says that the right
to sue will be upheld
provided that any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures (but not to exceed a four month lapse of time) before instituting




2 Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
'3 Tesoriero v. Miller, 274 App. Div, 670, 88 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1949); Summers, supra
note 9, at 209.
14 See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Htmv. L. REv. 1049,
1089-91 (1951).
'5 See Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies, 2 LAB. L.J. 487 (1951).
16 Summers, supra note 14.
17 Summers, The Law of Union Discipline; What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE
L.J. 175, 210 (1960).
18 Ibid.
19 See Vorenberg, supra note 15, at 493.
20 See, e.g., Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies, 2 LAB. L.J. 487
(1951); Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private Voluntary Associations, supra
note 10.
21 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 101,
73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1959).
22 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act)
§ 101(a)(4), 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1959).
23Ibid. (Italics in original.)
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This 'bill of rights" is an enumeration of rights granted to the union member
with respect to the union and its officers. The proviso is a qualification of one of
those rights. When rights exist between two parties, insofar as one party's right
is qualified, the other party has a privilege.2 4 Therefore, the apparent meaning of
this proviso is that it vests in the union the privilege of requiring exhaustion of
reasonable remedies not to exceed four months' duration. 25 However, contrary
interpretations had been made by persons supposedly in a position to know the
true legislative intent. Some of the legislators whose support led to its enactment
interpreted it as a codification of the common law doctrine of exhaustion of rem-
edies with a four month time limit superimposed.26
The Marriage
Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists2 7 was the first exhaustion of reme-
dies case to go to a court of appeals under the labor bill of rights. Detroy involved
an animal trainer suing his union because he had been placed on the organiza-
tion's "unfair list." His appearance on this list had made it impossible for his act
to find employment. Without any recourse whatever to the union's appellate pro-
cedures, Detroy brought suit under the labor bill of rights. The trial court denied
relief for lack of exhaustion.2s The Second Circuit reversed on appeal2 9
The facts of this case convinced the court that to require exhaustion would
work undue hardship upon this plaintiff. In Johnson v. International Bhd. of Elec-
trical Workers,30 a district court had already shown how relief might be granted
in such a ' ard" case without placing any strain on -the statutory language. In
Johnson the court simply found that the union's hearing procedures were not "rea-
sonable" 31 and therefore, not to be required. The Second Circuit in Detroy chose
24 See HoHmL, FuN~m.NAL LwAL CoNcEPTroNs 7, 38-39 (1923) on the
concept of the "no-right" and its correlative, the privilege.
25 This is substantially the meaning that was attached to it in the numerous law
journal articles written subsequent to the bill's passage. See, e.g., Sherman, The Indi-
vidual Member and the Union, The Bill of Rights Title in Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 803, 818 (1960). See generally
Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MicH.
L. REv. 819, 839-41 (1960) discussing the ambiguity of the statutory language.
2
6 Rep. Griffin said "existing decisions which require, or do not require exhaustion
of such remedies are not to be affected except as a time limit of four months is super-
imposed." 105 CONG. REc. 18152 (1959).
27286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
28 Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 189 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
29 Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
30 181 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
31 In Johnson, the court found that the union hearing procedures were both un-
reasonable per se, and unreasonable as to the plaintiffs because the local's acts were
not forbidden by union bylaws. Though this case has been distinguished in a few
cases where the question of reasonableness has been raised, it has not beerk followed
in any subsequent case where exhaustion of remedies has been waived. In the trial
court decision of Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 191 F. Supp. 347
(D. Del. 1961) the court first squarely followed Johnson on the unreasonableness per
se point (at 350) and then retracted this holding (rendered in the earlier opinion
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not to follow such an analysis; instead, it held that the exhaustion provision was
a requirement which "may be" imposed by a court. In other words, even if a
union satisfactorily showed that it had reasonable internal procedures capable of
taking corrective action within four months, it still might be possible for the ag-
grieved member to obtain immediate judicial relief without any resort to these
procedures. A court might or might not require exhaustion, depending upon the
facts of each individual case.
Once the statute is tortured into a legislative direction to the federal courts that
they may (or may not) require exhaustion as they see fit, the rest of the Detroy
opinion follows logically. Since the federal courts will be requiring (or not re-
quiring) exhaustion of remedies under the mandate of a federal statute, no state
law on exhaustion of remedies will be binding. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins3 2 does not
apply, and the federal courts may find their own exceptions to the rule. In effect
we have a codification of the common law doctrine of exhaustion of remedies with
one exception to the rule made specific, that of unreasonable delay, and the others
totally discarded, at least for the time being. Whether any of the other exceptions
currently prevalent in the states should furnish- cause for non-exhaustion would
have to be determined by -the "facts of each case."3 3 Detroy is somewhat unclear
as to what considerations would actually be material in this determination. First,
the court sets forth the underlying policies of the doctrine of exhaustion and
states why none of these policies would be served by postponing intervention in
the case at bar. Next the court lists at least three requisites that had been met in
Detroy's situation and states that, had any one of these been lacking, relief might
have been denied. The requisites were: (1) the facts revealed a clear violation
of the labor bill of rights; (2) immediate and irreparable injury was threatened;
(3) the wrong complained of could not adequately be redressed by the union's
tribunals.3 4
By mid-1964, Detroy had become the leading case on exhaustion of remedies
under the labor bill of rights.33 In approximately fifteen cases in the years 1961,
1962, and 1963, eleven denied relief squarely on grounds of non-exhaustion while
four waived the requirement.36 Ten of the opinions requiring exhaustion distin-
guished the case at hand from Detroy by making some application of the three
requisites mentioned previously.37 The eleventh contained a concurring opinion
granting a restraining order) in the part of the opinion which later grants a preliminary
injunction (at 353). Goldberg v. Amarillo General 1Drivers, 214 F. Supp. 74 (N.D.
Tex. 1963) follows Johnson in finding a union's hearing procedures to be unreasonable
but does so in construing an entirely different area of the LMRDA.
82 304 U. S. 64 (1937).
3s 286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1961).
34 286 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1961).
35 Cf. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 145 & n.4 (1964) (concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Stewart, citing Detroy).
86 Associated Orchestra Leaders v. Philadelphia Musical Soc'y, 203 F. Supp. 755
(E.D. Pa. 1962); Baron v. North Jersey Newspaper Guild, 224 F. Supp. 85 (D.N.J.
1963) (not citing Detroy but adopting the "court may or may not require" interpreta-
tion); Harvey v. Calhoon, 224 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Parks v. IBEW, 314
F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U. S. 978 (1963).
87 Harris v. ILA, 321 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1963); Borunica v. United Hatters, 321
F.2d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 1963); Edsberg v. IUOE, 300 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1962);
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that made no direct reference to Detroy but roundly criticized the "court may re-
quire" interpretation made by the Second Circuit.a8 Of the four decisions that
waive exhaustion, three find -that the three requisites of Detroy are met, and the
fourth39 turns entirely upon a delay in the union's proceedings of more than four
months..
Thus, until the beginning of 1964, the weight of authority clearly substanti-
ated the rule that if a union could show non-exhaustion of reasonable hearing
procedures capable of providing relief in four months, a plaintiff who could not
bring himself within the three requisites of Detroy could have no relief. In 1964,
the Second Circuit decided Farowitz v. Associated Musicians40 and Libutti v.
Di Brizzi.41 In each of these the requirement of exhaustion was waived for seem-
ingly different reasons-both different from each other and different from Detroy.
In Farowitz, exhaustion was waived solely due to futility of appeal. The plain-
tiff had been involved in a great deal of prior litigation with his union, both local
and national, and had finally been expelled from the organization. The district
judge ruled that any appeal to union tribunals would be futile due to prejudice
of the union hierarchy. The Second Circuit affirmed with little comment on the
exhaustion issue. It merely held that, on the facts of this case, where a temporary
injunction was sought, the district court had not exceeded its sound discretion in
waiving exhaustion on grounds of futility.
One of the "three requisites" set forth in Detroy was that the wrong com-
plained of could not adequately be redressed by the union's tribunals. Thus, in
Detroy and the three district court decisions following it in waiving exhaustion it
might also be said that the union member's appeal was futile, not because of
prejudice in the union tribunals, but because the internal proceedings were in-
capable of providing adequate relief. Viewed in this light, the decisions still re-
tained the common denominator of futility after Farowitz had been decided.
However, after the Second Circuit's decision of Libutti, any reconciliation of
the exception-finding cases on the grounds of futility is impossible. The trial court,
relying on Farowitz and Detroy, waived exhaustion on grounds of futility. The
circuit court opinion says nothing about futility; rather it says that the proceed-
ings were void. This inconsistency is understandable. It does not appear that there
was anything futile in an appeal to the union hierarchy by these plaintiffs. It does
appear that the proceedings which denied them the right to run for union office
were arbitrary, unfair, contrary to union bylaws, and therefore void. But this hold-
ing is rather surprising when we consider that this same court once said that it
McKeon v. Highway Drivers, 223 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D. Del. 1963); Webb v. Donald-
son, 214 F. Supp. 142, 144 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Deluhery v. MCS, 211 F. Supp. 529,
535 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Harris v. ILA, 205 F. Supp. 45, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Salz-
handler v. Caputo, 199 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Deluhery v. MCS, 199 F.
Supp. 270, 273 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Acevedo v. Bookbinders Local 25, 196 F. Supp.
308, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).38Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 306 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir.
1962) (concurring opinion of Hastie, J.). But see Harris v. ILA, 321 F.2d 801 (3d
Cir. 1963) (later opinion of Hastie, J. relying, in part, on Detroy).
soParks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
40 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964).
41337 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1964).
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would not and should not apply -the criteria of "voidness" in determining whether
exhaustion would be waived.
42
In rather ambiguous language the court in Libutti says:
When conceded or easily determined facts show a serious violation of the plain-
tiff's rights, the reasons for requiring exhaustion are absent: the commitment of
judicial resources is not great; the risk of misconstruing procedures unfamiliar
to the court is slight; a sufficient remedy given by the union tribunal would
have to approximate that offered by the court. Where, as in this case, conceded
facts show a serious violation of a fundamental right, we hold that plaintiffs
need not exhaust their union remedies. 43
It is possible to read the last sentence of this passage as the "rule" of the case.
It is also possible to construe -this sentence as meaning that whenever the con-
ceded facts show a violation by the union of the labor bill of rights, exhaustion
will not be required. If the court intended this latter meaning, it is difficult to
see why they would bother to discuss voidness of proceedings and the difficulties
in application of this exception to the common law doctrine. Further, it is difficult
to believe that a court that has gone to such pains to minimize the effect of
broadly phrased exceptions to the common law doctrine would coin a new excep-
tion to the exhaustion requirement that is at least as broad as any common law
exception. Therefore, it is more reasonable to read the first and last sentences of
the quoted passage as referring to the union member's right to have the union act
only in accordance with its own bylaws. Under this interpretation the "holding"
of the court would be that when conceded facts show a gross disregard of union
bylaws, the plaintiffs need not exhaust their remedies. This statement drives us
back to the initial query; if the common law exception of voidness can be applied
validly in some cases and not in others, how is one to differentiate the valid cases
from the invalid ones?
One answer is that the exception is applicable only where the violation of
rights is serious. Since this answer is hardly adequate, we must return to the
initial statement of the court in Detroy that "it is preferable to consider each case
on its own facts ... ."44 This statement suggests an equitable balancing of rights.
This kind of balancing process was the basis for Detroy and is the manner in
which the common law exceptions, void proceeding included, have been applied.
For -this reason, the sentence "When conceded facts show a serious violation...
we hold that plaintiffs need not exhaust. . .45 can no more be labeled the rule
of Libutti than can the three requisites be labeled the rule of Detroy. Both of
these "holdings" are conclusions that, when taken out of context, do not reflect
the analysis this court has pursued in deciding whether the facts of a case furnish
grounds for immediate judicial intervention.
Immediately after its first statement on "conceded or easily determined facts"
the court states why the reasons for requiring exhaustion are absent. In this state-
ment of reasons lies the essence of the Libutti opinion. It is a balancing of the
facts of the case against the policies of the doctrine of exhaustion. This is the only
42 Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1961).
P 337 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 1964).
44286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1964).
45 337 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 1964).
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feature that this decision has in common with the Detroy opinion. If we re-read
the latter after reading Libutti, the rationale behind the Second Circuit's decisions
in these exhaustion cases becomes clear.
In Detroy the court analyzed the facts in detail to demonstrate that no policy
of the doctrine could be served by requiring exhaustion in the case at bar. The
statement of "three requisites" was merely a part of its analysis of why the policy
of union autonomy would not be served in requiring exhaustion. Though it is pos-
sible to read this statement of three requisites as the rule of the case, the court
never intended that -these requisites be lifted out of context in which they were
set forth and given the status of an absolute rule of law.
With Libutti, it is now plain that the application of the exhaustion doctrine
that has been made by the Second Circuit is more like an equitable balancing of
relative rights than any cut-and-dried rule concerning exceptions to the require-
ment. As interpreted by this court, the labor bill of rights, while giving members
certain rights with respect -to their union, also gives the union the right to settle
its own internal disputes free from court intervention. However, when the mem-
ber's complaint cannot possibly be redressed by the union, his claim to immediate
judicial relief is enlarged and strengthened; when the union tribunals are ex-
tremely prejudiced or disregard their own bylaws, the union's right to autonomy
is diminished and weakened. The balance may then be tipped in favor of the
aggrieved member if, and only if, the other policies of the doctrine would not be
served by requiring exhaustion.
Conclusion
The Second Circuit has molded a section of the LMRDA into a special ex-
haustion of remedies doctrine for the labor bill of rights cases. It has been fol-
lowed in this construction by the overwhelming majority of federal courts. Libutti
v. Di Brizzi, when read with Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, makes
the nature of this doctrine rather clear. Once a union has shown that its proce-
dures in vacuo satisfy the statute46 (and practically all union procedures so tested
have satisfied it)47 the court has it within its sound discretion whether or not to
require utilization of these procedures. In exercising this discretion, the court
makes an enlightened application of the common law doctrine. This enlightened
application makes none of the common law exceptions conclusive grounds for im-
46 See Harris v. ILA, 321 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1963).
47 The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers seems to be the only union
that has failed the initial test of the statute. In Johnson v. IBEW, 181 F. Supp. 734
(E.D. Mich. 1960) their procedures were labelled unreasonable. In Parks v. IBEW,
314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963), their procedures were
labelled incapable of rendering decision in four months.
Two possible reasons why more cases have not involved waiver of exhaustion due
to "unreasonableness" or "four months" are: (1) once a union's procedures are labelled
unreasonable or incapable of rendering decision in four months, no member of that
union need utilize them before resorting to the courts with a labor bill of rights com-
plaint; (2) the procedures of unions have been tailored to fit the LMRDA since its
enactment. Some support for the latter proposition may be found in Previant, Have
Titles I-VI of Landrum-Griflin Served the Stated Legislative Purpose? 14 LAB. L.J.
28, 32 (1962).
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mediate intervention, but relegates these broadly phrased exceptions to the status
of factors to be weighed in balancing the plaintiff's need for immediate relief
against the policies underlying the doctrine. In this way the courts are committed
to the philosophy of the doctrine without being forced to use it in a way that
would work hardship upon any union member.
After considering the difficulties inherent in abolishing the exhaustion doc-
trine entirely or in enforcing it absolutely by finding no exceptions whatever, a
recent and comprehensive article on non-profit associations 48 came to the conclu-
sion that the optimum application of the doctrine would be "a flexible rule, shap-
ing exhaustion to the facts at hand."4 9 The cases reviewed here, especially Libutti
and Detroy, represent that type of application.
The line of cases reviewed by this note serve as binding precedent only in
the narrow area of suits brought in federal courts for infractions of the labor bill
of rights.5 0 However, the trend of these decisions may have a much wider influ-
ence. Professor Summers of Yale has stated that the standards enforced under the
LMRDA respecting exhaustion would be most influential in the state courts be-
cause of the previous confusion that has existed in -this area.5 1 Solicitor General
Cox wrote immediately after the act was passed that if the proviso set forth a
requirement to be imposed by the courts (which, he thought, it did not) it would
overturn state law on exhaustion of remedies in unions.52 Despite these learned
predictions, the LMRDA has received sparse citation in state court exhaustion
cases. 53 Perhaps one of the reasons for this has been the lack of definite standards
under the LMRDA. If this be true, the case of Libutti v. Di Brizzi may have far-
reaching effects as a clarification of those standards.
Thomas Boyle*
48 Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REv. 983 (1963).
49 Id. at 1078.
50But see Holdeman v. Sheldon, 204 F. Supp. 890, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) which
refuses to apply Detroy in a case brought under a section of the LMRDA outside of
the "bill of rights."
51 Summers, The Impact of Ldndrum-Grifiin in State Courts, 13 N.Y.U. CoNERa-
ENcE oN LABOR 333, 351 (1960).
52 Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,
58 Micr. L. REv. 819, 839-41 (1960).
53 See Rensch v. 'General Drivers, 268 Minn. 307, 129 N.W.2d 342 (1964);
Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 414 Pa. 294, 200 A.2d 306 (1964); Kopke v. Ranney
16 Wis. 2d 269, 114 N.W.2d 485 (1962); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145,
161 A.2d 882 (1960). These four are the only state court decisions which make
reference to the LMRDA exhaustion requirement. Falsetti and Kopke contain inferences
that the LMRDA has given new life to the doctrine of exhaustion.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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